SKILL.md
Constant-Time Analysis
Analyze cryptographic code to detect operations that leak secret data through execution timing variations.
When to Use
User writing crypto code? ──yes──> Use this skill
│
no
│
v
User asking about timing attacks? ──yes──> Use this skill
│
no
│
v
Code handles secret keys/tokens? ──yes──> Use this skill
│
no
│
v
Skip this skill
Concrete triggers:
- User implements signature, encryption, or key derivation
- Code contains
/or%operators on secret-derived values
- User mentions "constant-time", "timing attack", "side-channel", "KyberSlash"
- Reviewing functions named
sign,verify,encrypt,decrypt,derive_key
When NOT to Use
- Non-cryptographic code (business logic, UI, etc.)
- Public data processing where timing leaks don't matter
- Code that doesn't handle secrets, keys, or authentication tokens
- High-level API usage where timing is handled by the library
Language Selection
Based on the file extension or language context, refer to the appropriate guide:
Language
File Extensions
Guide
C, C++
.c, .h, .cpp, .cc, .hpp
Go
.go
Rust
.rs
Swift
.swift
Java
.java
Kotlin
.kt, .kts
C#
.cs
PHP
.php
JavaScript
.js, .mjs, .cjs
TypeScript
.ts, .tsx
Python
.py
Ruby
.rb
Quick Start
# Analyze any supported file type
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py <source_file>
# Include conditional branch warnings
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py --warnings <source_file>
# Filter to specific functions
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py --func 'sign|verify' <source_file>
# JSON output for CI
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py --json <source_file>
Native Compiled Languages Only (C, C++, Go, Rust)
# Cross-architecture testing (RECOMMENDED)
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py --arch x86_64 crypto.c
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py --arch arm64 crypto.c
# Multiple optimization levels
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py --opt-level O0 crypto.c
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py --opt-level O3 crypto.c
VM-Compiled Languages (Java, Kotlin, C#)
# Analyze Java bytecode
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py CryptoUtils.java
# Analyze Kotlin bytecode (Android/JVM)
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py CryptoUtils.kt
# Analyze C# IL
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py CryptoUtils.cs
Note: Java, Kotlin, and C# compile to bytecode (JVM/CIL) that runs on a virtual machine with JIT compilation. The analyzer examines the bytecode directly, not the JIT-compiled native code. The --arch and --opt-level flags do not apply to these languages.
Swift (iOS/macOS)
# Analyze Swift for native architecture
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py crypto.swift
# Analyze for specific architecture (iOS devices)
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py --arch arm64 crypto.swift
# Analyze with different optimization levels
uv run {baseDir}/ct_analyzer/analyzer.py --opt-level O0 crypto.swift
Note: Swift compiles to native code like C/C++/Go/Rust, so it uses assembly-level analysis and supports --arch and --opt-level flags.
Prerequisites
Language
Requirements
C, C++, Go, Rust
Compiler in PATH (gcc/clang, go, rustc)
Swift
Xcode or Swift toolchain (swiftc in PATH)
Java
JDK with javac and javap in PATH
Kotlin
Kotlin compiler (kotlinc) + JDK (javap) in PATH
C#
.NET SDK + ilspycmd (dotnet tool install -g ilspycmd)
PHP
PHP with VLD extension or OPcache
JavaScript/TypeScript
Node.js in PATH
Python
Python 3.x in PATH
Ruby
Ruby with --dump=insns support
macOS users: Homebrew installs Java and .NET as "keg-only". You must add them to your PATH:
# For Java (add to ~/.zshrc)
export PATH="/opt/homebrew/opt/openjdk@21/bin:$PATH"
# For .NET tools (add to ~/.zshrc)
export PATH="$HOME/.dotnet/tools:$PATH"
See references/vm-compiled.md for detailed setup instructions and troubleshooting.
Quick Reference
Problem
Detection
Fix
Division on secrets
DIV, IDIV, SDIV, UDIV
Barrett reduction or multiply-by-inverse
Branch on secrets
JE, JNE, BEQ, BNE
Constant-time selection (cmov, bit masking)
Secret comparison
Early-exit memcmp
Use crypto/subtle or constant-time compare
Weak RNG
rand(), mt_rand, Math.random
Use crypto-secure RNG
Table lookup by secret
Array subscript on secret index
Bit-sliced lookups
Interpreting Results
PASSED - No variable-time operations detected.
FAILED - Dangerous instructions found. Example:
[ERROR] SDIV
Function: decompose_vulnerable
Reason: SDIV has early termination optimization; execution time depends on operand values
Verifying Results (Avoiding False Positives)
CRITICAL: Not every flagged operation is a vulnerability. The tool has no data flow analysis - it flags ALL potentially dangerous operations regardless of whether they involve secrets.
For each flagged violation, ask: Does this operation's input depend on secret data?
-
Identify the secret inputs to the function (private keys, plaintext, signatures, tokens)
-
Trace data flow from the flagged instruction back to inputs
-
Common false positive patterns:
// FALSE POSITIVE: Division uses public constant, not secret
int num_blocks = data_len / 16; // data_len is length, not content
// TRUE POSITIVE: Division involves secret-derived value
int32_t q = secret_coef / GAMMA2; // secret_coef from private key
-
Document your analysis for each flagged item
Quick Triage Questions
Question
If Yes
If No
Is the operand a compile-time constant?
Likely false positive
Continue
Is the operand a public parameter (length, count)?
Likely false positive
Continue
Is the operand derived from key/plaintext/secret?
TRUE POSITIVE
Likely false positive
Can an attacker influence the operand value?
TRUE POSITIVE
Likely false positive
Limitations
-
Static Analysis Only: Analyzes assembly/bytecode, not runtime behavior. Cannot detect cache timing or microarchitectural side-channels.
-
No Data Flow Analysis: Flags all dangerous operations regardless of whether they process secrets. Manual review required.
-
Compiler/Runtime Variations: Different compilers, optimization levels, and runtime versions may produce different output.
Real-World Impact
- KyberSlash (2023): Division instructions in post-quantum ML-KEM implementations allowed key recovery
- Lucky Thirteen (2013): Timing differences in CBC padding validation enabled plaintext recovery
- RSA Timing Attacks: Early implementations leaked private key bits through division timing
References
- Cryptocoding Guidelines - Defensive coding for crypto
- KyberSlash - Division timing in post-quantum crypto
- BearSSL Constant-Time - Practical constant-time techniques