SKILL.md
When to use
Use this skill when you need to:
- Implement or debug an OAuth 2.0/2.1 flow in a Fastify application
- Validate tokens, configure PKCE, or set up refresh token rotation
- Secure Fastify routes and plugins with access-control middleware
- Resolve RFC compliance questions or identify security anti-patterns
Step-by-step: Authorization Code + PKCE in Fastify
1. Install dependencies
npm install @fastify/oauth2 @fastify/cookie @fastify/session fastify-plugin
2. Register the OAuth plugin
// plugins/oauth.ts
import fp from 'fastify-plugin'
import oauth2, { OAuth2Namespace } from '@fastify/oauth2'
import { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify'
export default fp(async function (fastify: FastifyInstance) {
fastify.register(oauth2, {
name: 'oauth2',
scope: ['openid', 'profile', 'email'],
credentials: {
client: {
id: process.env.CLIENT_ID!,
secret: process.env.CLIENT_SECRET!,
},
auth: {
authorizeHost: process.env.AUTH_SERVER!,
authorizePath: '/authorize',
tokenHost: process.env.AUTH_SERVER!,
tokenPath: '/token',
},
},
startRedirectPath: '/login',
callbackUri: process.env.CALLBACK_URI!,
pkce: 'S256', // RFC 7636 — always use for public clients
generateStateFunction: (req) => req.session.state = crypto.randomUUID(),
checkStateFunction: (req, callback) =>
req.query.state === req.session.state ? callback() : callback(new Error('State mismatch')),
})
})
Validation checkpoint: Confirm callbackUri exactly matches a registered redirect URI at the authorization server before proceeding (RFC 6749 §3.1.2).
3. Handle the callback and exchange the code
// routes/auth.ts
import { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify'
export default async function authRoutes(fastify: FastifyInstance) {
fastify.get('/login/callback', async (request, reply) => {
// @fastify/oauth2 verifies state and exchanges code automatically
const tokenResponse = await fastify.oauth2.getAccessTokenFromAuthorizationCodeFlow(request)
// Store only what you need; never log the raw token
request.session.set('accessToken', tokenResponse.token.access_token)
request.session.set('refreshToken', tokenResponse.token.refresh_token)
return reply.redirect('/')
})
fastify.get('/logout', async (request, reply) => {
await request.session.destroy()
return reply.redirect('/')
})
}
4. JWT validation middleware (token introspection hook)
// hooks/verifyToken.ts
import { FastifyRequest, FastifyReply } from 'fastify'
import jwt from '@fastify/jwt'
export async function verifyToken(request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) {
try {
await request.jwtVerify()
// Validate required claims (RFC 7519)
const payload = request.user as Record<string, unknown>
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)
if (typeof payload.exp === 'number' && payload.exp < now)
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'token_expired' })
if (payload.iss !== process.env.EXPECTED_ISSUER)
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'invalid_issuer' })
if (payload.aud !== process.env.EXPECTED_AUDIENCE)
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'invalid_audience' })
} catch (err) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'invalid_token', error_description: (err as Error).message })
}
}
Validation checkpoints:
- Verify
exp,iss,aud, andsubon every request — never skip (RFC 7519 §4)
- Use
fastify.jwt.verify(asymmetric RS256/ES256) rather than HS256 for tokens issued by a third-party server
5. Protecting routes
// routes/api.ts
import { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify'
import { verifyToken } from '../hooks/verifyToken'
export default async function apiRoutes(fastify: FastifyInstance) {
fastify.addHook('onRequest', verifyToken) // applies to all routes in this scope
fastify.get('/me', {
schema: {
response: { 200: { type: 'object', properties: { sub: { type: 'string' } } } },
},
}, async (request) => {
const user = request.user as { sub: string }
return { sub: user.sub }
})
}
6. Refresh token rotation
async function refreshAccessToken(fastify: FastifyInstance, refreshToken: string) {
const newToken = await fastify.oauth2.getNewAccessTokenUsingRefreshTokenFlow({ refresh_token: refreshToken })
// Always replace the stored refresh token if rotation is in use (RFC 6749 §10.4)
return {
accessToken: newToken.token.access_token,
refreshToken: newToken.token.refresh_token ?? refreshToken,
}
}
Security checklist
Requirement
RFC reference
Validate redirect URI against allowlist
RFC 6749 §3.1.2
PKCE (S256) for all public clients
RFC 7636 §4.2
Validate state to prevent CSRF
RFC 6749 §10.12
Validate iss, aud, exp on every JWT
RFC 7519 §4
Rotate refresh tokens on every use
RFC 6749 §10.4
Use HTTPS everywhere; reject HTTP redirect URIs
RFC 6749 §3.1.2.1
Rate-limit token endpoints
OAuth 2.1 §7
Common anti-patterns
- Storing tokens in localStorage — use
HttpOnly,Secure,SameSite=Strictcookies instead
- Skipping audience validation — allows token reuse across services
- Using implicit flow — deprecated in OAuth 2.1; use authorization code + PKCE
- **Accepting
response_type=tokenin browser apps** — tokens in URL fragments leak in logs/referrers
- Symmetric signing (HS256) for third-party tokens — use RS256/ES256 with JWKS endpoint
Further implementation references
- See
DEVICE_FLOW.mdfor device authorization flow (RFC 8628) implementation
- See
TOKEN_VALIDATION.mdfor JWKS rotation, caching strategies, and opaque token introspection
- See
CLIENT_CREDENTIALS.mdfor machine-to-machine service authentication patterns
- See
MOBILE_OAUTH.mdfor native/mobile app flows (RFC 8252) and custom URI schemes