SKILL.md
Security Review Skill
Identify exploitable security vulnerabilities in code. Report only HIGH CONFIDENCE findings—clear vulnerable patterns with attacker-controlled input.
Scope: Research vs. Reporting
CRITICAL DISTINCTION:
- Report on: Only the specific file, diff, or code provided by the user
- Research: The ENTIRE codebase to build confidence before reporting
Before flagging any issue, you MUST research the codebase to understand:
- Where does this input actually come from? (Trace data flow)
- Is there validation/sanitization elsewhere?
- How is this configured? (Check settings, config files, middleware)
- What framework protections exist?
Do NOT report issues based solely on pattern matching. Investigate first, then report only what you're confident is exploitable.
Confidence Levels
Level
Criteria
Action
HIGH
Vulnerable pattern + attacker-controlled input confirmed
Report with severity
MEDIUM
Vulnerable pattern, input source unclear
Note as "Needs verification"
LOW
Theoretical, best practice, defense-in-depth
Do not report
Do Not Flag
General Rules
- Test files (unless explicitly reviewing test security)
- Dead code, commented code, documentation strings
- Patterns using constants or server-controlled configuration
- Code paths that require prior authentication to reach (note the auth requirement instead)
Server-Controlled Values (NOT Attacker-Controlled)
These are configured by operators, not controlled by attackers:
Source
Example
Why It's Safe
Django settings
settings.API_URL, settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS
Set via config/env at deployment
Environment variables
os.environ.get('DATABASE_URL')
Deployment configuration
Config files
config.yaml, app.config['KEY']
Server-side files
Framework constants
django.conf.settings.*
Not user-modifiable
Hardcoded values
BASE_URL = "https://api.internal"
Compile-time constants
SSRF Example - NOT a vulnerability:
# SAFE: URL comes from Django settings (server-controlled)
response = requests.get(f"{settings.SEER_AUTOFIX_URL}{path}")
SSRF Example - IS a vulnerability:
# VULNERABLE: URL comes from request (attacker-controlled)
response = requests.get(request.GET.get('url'))
Framework-Mitigated Patterns
Check language guides before flagging. Common false positives:
Pattern
Why It's Usually Safe
Django {{ variable }}
Auto-escaped by default
React {variable}
Auto-escaped by default
Vue {{ variable }}
Auto-escaped by default
User.objects.filter(id=input)
ORM parameterizes queries
cursor.execute("...%s", (input,))
Parameterized query
innerHTML = "<b>Loading...</b>"
Constant string, no user input
Only flag these when:
- Django:
{{ var|safe }},{% autoescape off %},mark_safe(user_input)
- React:
dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{__html: userInput}}
- Vue:
v-html="userInput"
- ORM:
.raw(),.extra(),RawSQL()with string interpolation
Review Process
1. Detect Context
What type of code am I reviewing?
Code Type
Load These References
API endpoints, routes
authorization.md, authentication.md, injection.md
Frontend, templates
xss.md, csrf.md
File handling, uploads
file-security.md
Crypto, secrets, tokens
cryptography.md, data-protection.md
Data serialization
deserialization.md
External requests
ssrf.md
Business workflows
business-logic.md
GraphQL, REST design
api-security.md
Config, headers, CORS
misconfiguration.md
CI/CD, dependencies
supply-chain.md
Error handling
error-handling.md
Audit, logging
logging.md
2. Load Language Guide
Based on file extension or imports:
Indicators
Guide
.py, django, flask, fastapi
languages/python.md
.js, .ts, express, react, vue, next
languages/javascript.md
.go, go.mod
languages/go.md
.rs, Cargo.toml
languages/rust.md
.java, spring, @Controller
languages/java.md
3. Load Infrastructure Guide (if applicable)
File Type
Guide
Dockerfile, .dockerignore
infrastructure/docker.md
K8s manifests, Helm charts
infrastructure/kubernetes.md
.tf, Terraform
infrastructure/terraform.md
GitHub Actions, .gitlab-ci.yml
infrastructure/ci-cd.md
AWS/GCP/Azure configs, IAM
infrastructure/cloud.md
4. Research Before Flagging
For each potential issue, research the codebase to build confidence:
- Where does this value actually come from? Trace the data flow.
- Is it configured at deployment (settings, env vars) or from user input?
- Is there validation, sanitization, or allowlisting elsewhere?
- What framework protections apply?
Only report issues where you have HIGH confidence after understanding the broader context.
5. Verify Exploitability
For each potential finding, confirm:
Is the input attacker-controlled?
Attacker-Controlled (Investigate)
Server-Controlled (Usually Safe)
request.GET, request.POST, request.args
settings.X, app.config['X']
request.json, request.data, request.body
os.environ.get('X')
request.headers (most headers)
Hardcoded constants
request.cookies (unsigned)
Internal service URLs from config
URL path segments: /users/<id>/
Database content from admin/system
File uploads (content and names)
Signed session data
Database content from other users
Framework settings
WebSocket messages
Does the framework mitigate this?
- Check language guide for auto-escaping, parameterization
- Check for middleware/decorators that sanitize
Is there validation upstream?
- Input validation before this code
- Sanitization libraries (DOMPurify, bleach, etc.)
6. Report HIGH Confidence Only
Skip theoretical issues. Report only what you've confirmed is exploitable after research.
Severity Classification
Severity
Impact
Examples
Critical
Direct exploit, severe impact, no auth required
RCE, SQL injection to data, auth bypass, hardcoded secrets
High
Exploitable with conditions, significant impact
Stored XSS, SSRF to metadata, IDOR to sensitive data
Medium
Specific conditions required, moderate impact
Reflected XSS, CSRF on state-changing actions, path traversal
Low
Defense-in-depth, minimal direct impact
Missing headers, verbose errors, weak algorithms in non-critical context
Quick Patterns Reference
Always Flag (Critical)
eval(user_input) # Any language
exec(user_input) # Any language
pickle.loads(user_data) # Python
yaml.load(user_data) # Python (not safe_load)
unserialize($user_data) # PHP
deserialize(user_data) # Java ObjectInputStream
shell=True + user_input # Python subprocess
child_process.exec(user) # Node.js
Always Flag (High)
innerHTML = userInput # DOM XSS
dangerouslySetInnerHTML={user} # React XSS
v-html="userInput" # Vue XSS
f"SELECT * FROM x WHERE {user}" # SQL injection
`SELECT * FROM x WHERE ${user}` # SQL injection
os.system(f"cmd {user_input}") # Command injection
Always Flag (Secrets)
password = "hardcoded"
api_key = "sk-..."
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY = "..."
private_key = "-----BEGIN"
Check Context First (MUST Investigate Before Flagging)
# SSRF - ONLY if URL is from user input, NOT from settings/config
requests.get(request.GET['url']) # FLAG: User-controlled URL
requests.get(settings.API_URL) # SAFE: Server-controlled config
requests.get(f"{settings.BASE}/{x}") # CHECK: Is 'x' user input?
# Path traversal - ONLY if path is from user input
open(request.GET['file']) # FLAG: User-controlled path
open(settings.LOG_PATH) # SAFE: Server-controlled config
open(f"{BASE_DIR}/{filename}") # CHECK: Is 'filename' user input?
# Open redirect - ONLY if URL is from user input
redirect(request.GET['next']) # FLAG: User-controlled redirect
redirect(settings.LOGIN_URL) # SAFE: Server-controlled config
# Weak crypto - ONLY if used for security purposes
hashlib.md5(file_content) # SAFE: File checksums, caching
hashlib.md5(password) # FLAG: Password hashing
random.random() # SAFE: Non-security uses (UI, sampling)
random.random() for token # FLAG: Security tokens need secrets module
Output Format
## Security Review: [File/Component Name]
### Summary
- **Findings**: X (Y Critical, Z High, ...)
- **Risk Level**: Critical/High/Medium/Low
- **Confidence**: High/Mixed
### Findings
#### [VULN-001] [Vulnerability Type] (Severity)
- **Location**: `file.py:123`
- **Confidence**: High
- **Issue**: [What the vulnerability is]
- **Impact**: [What an attacker could do]
- **Evidence**:
```python
[Vulnerable code snippet]
- Fix: [How to remediate]
Needs Verification
#### [VERIFY-001] [Potential Issue]
- Location:
file.py:456
- Question: [What needs to be verified]
If no vulnerabilities found, state: "No high-confidence vulnerabilities identified."
---
## Reference Files
### Core Vulnerabilities (`references/`)
| File | Covers |
|------|--------|
| `injection.md` | SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP, template injection |
| `xss.md` | Reflected, stored, DOM-based XSS |
| `authorization.md` | Authorization, IDOR, privilege escalation |
| `authentication.md` | Sessions, credentials, password storage |
| `cryptography.md` | Algorithms, key management, randomness |
| `deserialization.md` | Pickle, YAML, Java, PHP deserialization |
| `file-security.md` | Path traversal, uploads, XXE |
| `ssrf.md` | Server-side request forgery |
| `csrf.md` | Cross-site request forgery |
| `data-protection.md` | Secrets exposure, PII, logging |
| `api-security.md` | REST, GraphQL, mass assignment |
| `business-logic.md` | Race conditions, workflow bypass |
| `modern-threats.md` | Prototype pollution, LLM injection, WebSocket |
| `misconfiguration.md` | Headers, CORS, debug mode, defaults |
| `error-handling.md` | Fail-open, information disclosure |
| `supply-chain.md` | Dependencies, build security |
| `logging.md` | Audit failures, log injection |
### Language Guides (`languages/`)
- `python.md` - Django, Flask, FastAPI patterns
- `javascript.md` - Node, Express, React, Vue, Next.js
- `go.md` - Go-specific security patterns
- `rust.md` - Rust unsafe blocks, FFI security
- `java.md` - Spring, Java EE patterns
### Infrastructure (`infrastructure/`)
- `docker.md` - Container security
- `kubernetes.md` - K8s RBAC, secrets, policies
- `terraform.md` - IaC security
- `ci-cd.md` - Pipeline security
- `cloud.md` - AWS/GCP/Azure security